SNI

HTTPS Lock Icon Present but List of Visited Sites Remains Visible

Even when HTTPS is active and passwords stay protected, DNS queries and the SNI field in TLS handshakes expose the exact domains a user visits over public Wi-Fi. Classic unencrypted DNS over UDP sends domain names in plaintext, allowing anyone on the same network to observe them with simple packet captures. The SNI extension reveals the target hostname before encryption is negotiated, enabling domain-based filtering without decrypting traffic. DNS over HTTPS moves queries inside encrypted channels but shifts visibility to the chosen resolver instead of the local network. Encrypted Client Hello offers partial protection for SNI yet requires support from both browsers and server infrastructure. The practical takeaway is that metadata about services used, timing, and frequency leaks more readily than credentials in modern public networks.

Configuration Drift Silently Breaks Multi-Hop Chains in sing-box Reality Fleet

A post-mortem analysis of a censorship circumvention network using sing-box and Reality revealed that four out of seven nodes were unreachable due to outdated allowlists, even though all monitoring reported green status. The fleet consisted of 14 endpoints across seven machines and four providers, with traffic routed in two hops where entry nodes only knew client identities and exit nodes only knew destinations. White-list rules on entry nodes permitted only five addresses instead of all required relays, causing urltest to silently discard most chains without logging failures. Canary checks, external probes, and the relay-lockdown.sh script all passed because none compared the allowlist against the full signed configuration. Two private paid nodes lacked any route section entirely, exposing them to potential abuse. The issue stemmed from configuration drift over time, with no single person maintaining an overview of the entire system. Automated fixes were implemented with safeguards to prevent fleet-wide lockouts.

One Request, Five Observers: What Websites, Providers, DNS and VPNs Learn When Loading a Page

The article breaks down exactly what each participant in a typical web request can observe when a user visits a page over HTTPS. It examines the roles of the browser, DNS resolver, ISP, VPN service and the destination site itself, showing that each sees different pieces of metadata or content. HTTPS protects the page body and parameters from network observers, while Encrypted Client Hello and secure DNS further limit visibility of domain names. VPNs replace the user's home IP address with the VPN exit node but introduce a new trusted party that sees all traffic metadata. Browser fingerprinting, cookies and account logins often allow sites to re-identify users even after an IP change. The piece stresses that privacy tools must be chosen according to the specific threat model rather than relying on any single mechanism.