RBAC

Building the Foundation of Digital Trust: Why Identity Security Remains Undervalued

Identity Security is presented as one of the most underestimated pillars of cybersecurity because granting access involves trusting individuals with sensitive information and systems. The article examines the deep intersection of IT and security functions, the costs of manual access errors, and the need to align business processes with technical controls. It references a 2026 Identity Conf study showing 43.5% of organizations experienced errors in manual rights assignment and 33.5% left access for former employees. Recommendations draw on NIST Human-Centered Cybersecurity concepts, SP 800-53, and Russian FSTEC Order No. 117 to design lifecycle processes covering account provisioning, privilege reviews, and continuous monitoring. Models such as RBAC and ABAC are discussed alongside IGA and IdM solutions to ensure business permissions map correctly to application rights. The piece stresses that successful projects require joint IT and security efforts from the initial survey through pilot and acceptance phases while measuring both risk reduction and operational efficiency.

Avoiding a Leaky Kubernetes Audit Policy: Real-World Configuration Breakdown

Kubernetes Audit Policy is typically configured once during cluster setup and then left untouched for years while accumulating exceptions for new components. Over time the policy stops functioning as a security control and instead becomes an archaeological layer of outdated comments such as "# temporary, TODO remove" that date back three years or more. The author recently reviewed their own 580-line configuration file that had been assembled from multiple sources. Primary reference was the Kubernetes Threat Matrix, which explains why many rules are designed to detect security-relevant actions rather than simply reduce log noise. Examples include targeted monitoring of RBAC modifications and deletion of events. The article emphasizes the need for periodic full reviews instead of incremental patching to maintain effective detection coverage.

GitLab Developer Account Leads to Full OpenStack Cloud Control via CI/CD Runner Misconfigurations

A penetration testing team demonstrated how a standard developer account in GitLab can be escalated to full administrative control over an OpenStack cloud environment through typical CI/CD misconfigurations. Starting with only GitLab credentials, the testers created a pipeline that executed arbitrary commands on a production Kubernetes runner named PROD-K8S-RUNNER01. Membership in the docker group allowed privilege escalation to root by mounting the host filesystem and adding an SSH key. From the compromised host, the team discovered a kubeconfig file granting extensive Kubernetes permissions including secret access, pod execution, and role bindings. This access enabled mounting a node filesystem to extract OpenStack cloud-config credentials. The resulting cloud account possessed broad roles across nova, cinder, neutron, and other services, effectively providing administrator-level control over virtual machines, networks, storage, and managed Kubernetes clusters.