Positive Technologies researchers have published a detailed analysis of Drama RAT, a multifunctional Android banking trojan equipped with remote access capabilities. The family spreads through phishing messages in messengers and masquerades as VPN services, banking applications, or cracked utilities with paid features.
All analyzed samples function as droppers. After launch, the user sees a notification about an outdated version and is prompted to install an update. Upon granting installation rights from unknown sources, the dropper sends device information and a list of installed applications to the C2 server, then downloads the main payload.
The dropper contains a library that implements C2 communication and device identification. It transmits a device fingerprint consisting of the SHA-256 hash of the concatenation of ANDROID_ID and the application signature. The server responds with the encrypted payload and part of the decryption key. The final key is assembled from the server-supplied component, a hardcoded value, and the SHA-256 hash of the dropper signature.
After decryption and installation of the payload, the trojan immediately begins exfiltrating device data including identifier, Android version, battery level, network type, wallpaper, SIM information, and granted permissions. It periodically sends heartbeat requests containing accelerometer data to confirm connectivity.
Drama RAT requests Accessibility service permission and then uses libnative_core.so to automatically grant itself additional rights to SMS, contacts, microphone, and screen recording. It overlays a black opaque block to hide the permission-granting process from the user and can draw nearly transparent images to bypass Android 12 camera and microphone indicators.
The trojan implements an extensive set of malicious functions: SMS interception and default SMS handler replacement, clipboard manipulation, browser data theft, real-time keylogging, overlay phishing, application enumeration, call spoofing, VNC screen sharing, covert microphone and camera recording, credential theft, icon hiding, notification suppression, and participation in DDoS attacks directed by the C2 server.
Communication occurs over WebSocket with mutual TLS authentication using a client certificate embedded in libnative_core.so. A fallback channel uses HTTPS requests through CDN domains. Persistence is achieved via AlarmManager alarms firing every eight seconds, Doze mode bypass, and automatic restart after device reboot.
When the user attempts to access settings to uninstall the application or revoke permissions, the malware redirects them to the home screen or main settings menu. Removal is only possible via ADB or by booting into safe mode.
The payload is protected by more than 1200 junk artifacts, deliberately corrupted AndroidManifest.xml structures, root and hooking detection, ptrace anti-debugging, and runtime string decryption that uses Base64 decoding followed by arithmetic operations with per-class keys.


