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Cybercriminals Weaponize OpenClaw AI Agent in ClawHavoc Campaign to Distribute Infostealers

Threat actors have repurposed the OpenClaw AI agent to deliver infostealers by uploading hundreds of malicious skills to ClawHub. The campaign, named ClawHavoc, tricks users into executing encoded commands or installing required tools under the guise of helpful AI recommendations. Researchers at Trellix identified 341 malicious skills, with 335 targeting installation of Atomic macOS Stealer on macOS systems. On Windows, victims receive password-protected archives and fake verification utilities that mirror classic ClickFix tactics. Analysis of repository history uncovered 1,184 suspicious packages linked to 12 authors, enabling theft of passwords, browser data, crypto wallets, API keys, SSH keys, and source code. Users are advised to update OpenClaw, audit installed skills, remove suspicious packages, and rotate potentially compromised credentials while running the agent in a restricted environment.

AntiMalwareTranslated from Russian

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Cybercriminals have turned the OpenClaw AI agent into a convincing delivery mechanism for infostealers through a campaign called ClawHavoc.

Attackers uploaded hundreds of seemingly useful skills to the ClawHub catalog. These skills prompt users to install a mandatory tool or paste an encoded command into the terminal, all while appearing as legitimate configuration steps recommended by the AI assistant.

On macOS, victims are directed to commands that download the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS). On Windows, the same technique delivers password-protected archives and fake verification utilities, recreating the classic ClickFix social-engineering pattern but with an AI assistant acting as the trusted courier.

Researchers from Trellix discovered 341 malicious skills in total, 335 of which used fabricated installation requirements for AMOS. Repository history analysis revealed 1,184 suspicious packages associated with 12 distinct authors.

The stolen data includes passwords, browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, API keys, SSH keys, cloud accounts, .env files, source code, and tokens for connected services. Once OpenClaw has unrestricted terminal access, a simple text instruction can be converted into a PowerShell or Bash command.

Users are recommended to update OpenClaw, review all installed skills, remove anything suspicious, and rotate any potentially leaked credentials. Security experts advise running the agent in an isolated environment with minimal privileges and no access to production secrets.

OpenClawClawHubClawHavocTrellixAtomic macOS Stealer
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