A vulnerability in a GitHub Actions workflow at Snowflake allowed any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands on a runner simply by opening a specially crafted issue in a public repository.
The flaw resided in the snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net repository. Issue titles and bodies were passed directly into shell commands without proper sanitization, creating a classic command-injection vector. An intended access-control check also failed because it referenced a pull-request property that does not exist in issue events, allowing ordinary users to bypass the restriction.
During authorized testing, an autonomous security agent exploited the weakness and retrieved a Jira API token stored in the workflow’s environment variables. The token provided read access to internal projects covering engineering, security compliance, and bug-bounty programs—information that could support further attack stages.
The vulnerable workflow remained active between 18 and 23 June 2026. Snowflake fixed the code on the same day the report was received and replaced the exposed token the following day. The affected code had been introduced in a pull request that included participation from GitHub Copilot, although the commit history does not prove the AI generated the insecure lines.


