Positive Technologies Uncovers Disinformation Factory Linking 45 Domains and 74 Telegram Channels

Researchers at Positive Technologies have exposed an integrated disinformation operation that combined fake government emails with a network of pseudo-news websites and synchronized social media channels. The campaign began with emails sent from lookalike domains such as minpromtorg.digital and gosuslugi.digital, requesting employee lists and salary data to prepare targeted phishing attacks. Parallel to the email activity, operators maintained at least 45 domains including rulenta.live and crime24.live that mixed genuine stories with fabricated content and cited nonexistent sources. These sites were amplified through dozens of Telegram channels and accounts on VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, creating a self-reinforcing loop where fabricated claims were quoted back as credible reporting. Investigators noted a possible infrastructure overlap with the cybercriminal group Rare Werewolf, although direct attribution remains unconfirmed. The operation demonstrates a complete information pipeline from initial reconnaissance via email to wide distribution of disinformation across multiple platforms.

AntiMalwareAugust 4, 2026Translated from Russian

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Researchers from Positive Technologies have identified a large-scale disinformation factory that combined fraudulent emails, fabricated news sites, and coordinated social-media amplification. The operation involved 45 domains and at least 74 Telegram channels, forming a single, self-sustaining information network.

The scheme started with emails sent on behalf of Russian government agencies and major companies. Attackers used domains such as minpromtorg.digital, gosuslugi.digital, and rosstat.live that closely resembled official addresses but employed zones including .digital, .live, and .work. Recipients were asked to provide lists of employees, salary information, and other internal data, likely to support subsequent targeted phishing campaigns. The messages contained no malicious attachments; their purpose was to verify active addresses and willing respondents.

At the same time, operators ran a parallel network of pseudo-news websites. These platforms blended authentic publications with invented stories, referenced nonexistent sources, and adopted regional narratives. Among the identified domains were rulenta.live, crime24.live, daganews.ru, and pressklub.az. Fabricated claims published on one site were frequently cited by others as authoritative confirmation, creating a closed loop of apparent legitimacy.

Distribution relied on multiple platforms: VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram. Channels were disguised as regional or patriotic communities and often posted identical material simultaneously, driving traffic to the linked websites. Some channels had accumulated thousands of subscribers.

Investigators observed a possible connection to the cybercriminal group Rare Werewolf. One domain previously hosted an archive named bk.rar, a path previously associated with the group’s infrastructure. However, Positive Technologies stated that available evidence is insufficient for definitive attribution and described the link as probable rather than confirmed.

The operation illustrates a complete information pipeline: reconnaissance emails collect contact data, pseudo-news sites lend credibility to fabrications, and synchronized social-media activity ensures wide dissemination to targeted audiences.

Positive Technologies Rare Werewolf

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