Huntress researchers have examined three sophisticated phishing kits designed to steal Microsoft 365 session tokens, giving attackers ready-to-use authenticated access instead of mere credentials.
Modern kits now operate like legitimate SaaS products, complete with admin dashboards, real-time relay capabilities, and even round-the-clock support. They focus on capturing tokens through device code phishing, adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques, and direct token theft, allowing attackers to replay sessions where MFA has already been satisfied.
Device Code and AiTM Techniques
In device code attacks, the victim authenticates directly with Microsoft while the attacker silently captures the authorization code and resulting tokens. This approach feels like a normal sign-in to the user because no credentials are entered on a fake page.
AiTM kits relay the authentication flow in real time, intercepting the exchange so the victim completes MFA while the attacker obtains a valid session token. Once replayed, the token grants immediate access to cloud resources and email without further interaction.
Three Kits Targeting Microsoft 365
EvilTokens was discovered in early 2026 during a device code campaign hosted on the Railway Platform-as-a-Service infrastructure. A joint operation by Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit and the FBI later resulted in the arrest of one alleged operator.
Knight Office is an AiTM kit that steals valid session tokens and feeds them into an operator console, enabling replay and persistence across tenant accounts.
Kali365 provides a complete Phishing-as-a-Service platform with device code harvesting, reverse-proxy lures, token replay into live sessions, access maintenance, and AI-driven scaling features.
Defender Recommendations
Security teams should trace the full attack sequence from initial lure through token issuance, device registration, and mailbox activity. Key indicators include successful sign-ins from unfamiliar cloud infrastructure, device code authentication events, new devices or authentication methods, and suspicious mailbox rules.
Response priorities include revoking refresh tokens, removing unauthorized devices and Windows Hello credentials, restricting device code flows where possible, and continuing to hunt for replay attempts even after the original phishing domain is taken down.


